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Hopkins v. Reeves
118 S. Ct. 1895 (1998)
I. Facts
On the morning of March 29, 1980, the police responded to an emergency
call from the Religious Society of Friends meeting-house in Lincoln, Nebraska.'
Janet Mesner ("Mesner") was found lying on the floor of the rear of the house,
suffering from the infliction of seven stab wounds in her chest.2 The partially
nude dead body of Mesner's friend, Victoria Lamm ("Lamm"), was discovered
in an upstairs bedroom.3 The police retrieved a wallet, containing identification
of the defendant, Randolph K. Reeves ("Reeves"), from near Lamm's body.4 A
pair of blood-soaked underwear with traces of semen, later linked to Reeves, was
found lying in the middle of the bed.' A serrated knife with Mesner's blood on
it was located in the kitchen.6 When asked by the police if she knew who stabbed
her, Mesner gave Reeves's name.7 Before dying, Mesner also revealed to the
police that the defendant had raped her.'
Reeves was charged with the first degree murder of Mesner and Lamm
under the felony murder theory that Reeves killed Mesner in the perpetration of
a sexual assault in the first degree.9 At trial, Reeves requested that the jury be
given instructions on murder in the second degree and manslaughter."° The trial
court declined to do so, basing its denial on Nebraska precedent holding that
1. Hopkins v. Reeves, 118 S. Ct. 1895, 1898 (1998).








9. Reeves, 118 S. Ct. at 1898. Nebraska's first degree murder statute reads in its entirety:
A person commits murder in the first degree if he kills another person (1) purposely
and with deliberate and premeditated malice, or (2) in the perpetration of or attempt
to perpetrate any sexual assault in the first degree, arson, robbery, kidnapping, hijacking
of any public or private means of transportation, or burglary, or (3) by administering
poison or causing the same to be done; or if by willful and corrupt perjury or suborna-
tion of the same he purposely procures the conviction and execution of any innocent
person. The determination of whether murder in the first degree shall be punished as
a Class I or Class IA felony shall be made pursuant to sections 29-2520 to 25-2524.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303 (1997).
10. Reeves, 118 S.Ct. at 1898.
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second degree murder and manslaughter are not lesser included offenses of
felony murder." Following the jury's return of guilty verdicts for the first degree
murder of both Mesner and Lamm, a three-judge sentencing panel weighed the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances as required by Nebraska law and sen-
tenced Reeves to death on both convictions.
12
The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed Reeves's convictions and sen-
tences. 13 The state court's denial of the defendant's petition for collateral relief
was vacated by the United States Supreme Court for further consideration in
light of Clemons v. Mississippi.4 On remand, the Supreme Court of Nebraska
reaffirmed the death sentence.' 5 Reeves then filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal district court alleging, among other things, that under Beck v.
Alabama6 the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on second-degree murder
and manslaughter was unconstitutional. 7 The District Court rejected this claim
but granted relief on unrelated grounds. 8 When the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded on the unrelated issue, 9
the district court again granted the petition, finding a due process violation
arising out of the Supreme Court of Nebraska's reaffirmation of Reeves's sen-
tences.' On review, the court of appeals determined that the Nebraska trial
court's failure to give the instructions on second-degree murder and manslaugh-
ter as requested by defense counsel resulted in constitutional error under Beck.2'
The state appealed this holding to the United States Supreme Court.
II. Holding
Justice Thomas delivered the majority opinion of the Court, holding that the
analysis of Beck v. Alabama did not apply to Reeves because Nebraska state law
11. Id.
12. Id at 1898-99.
13. State v. Reeves, 344 N.W.2d 433 (Neb. 1984).
14. Reeves v. Nebraska, 498 U.S. 964 (1990) (citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738
(1990)). The case was remanded "because [Reeves's] death sentence had been based in part on an
invalid aggravating factor." Reeves, 118 S. Ct. at 1899.
15. Reeves, 118 S. Ct. at 1899.
16. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
17. Reeves, 118 S. Ct. at 1899. Beck v. Alabama held unconstitutional Alabama's statutory
scheme requiring that the jury not be instructed as to the lesser included offenses of felony murder
when the defendant was a capital defendant. The decision notes several factors that played a
significant role in making this determination: the difference in treatment between capital and non-
capital defendants; the pressure of the jury to make a decision between death and freedom; and the
fact that, under Alabama law, second-degree murder and manslaughter are lesser included offenses
of felony murder. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
18. Reeves v. Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. 1182, 1202, 1205-06 (D. Neb. 1994).
19. Reeves v. Hopkins, 76 F.3d 1424, 1427-31 (8th Cir. 1996).
20. Reeves v. Hopkins, 928 F. Supp. 941,959-65 (D. Neb. 1996).
21. Reeves v. Hopkins, 102 F.3d 977 (8th Cir. 1996).
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does not identify second-degree murder and manslaughter as lesser included
offenses of felony murder as a matter of law. Because the Eighth Circuit based
its decision on the applicability of Beck, the Court reversed the judgment granting
Reeves a conditional writ of habeas corpus.'
III. Anaysis/Application in Virginia
A. Distinctions Drawn Between Reeves and Beck v. Alabama
The Court's decision turned on the difference between Nebraska state law,
applicable to the case at bar, and Alabama state law, central to the Beck decision.
23
The Alabama law at issue in Beck acknowledged the non-capital, lesser included
offense of felony murder but refused to apply the construction in capital cases,
even where fairly raised by the evidence.24 On the other hand, there is no statutory
recognition of the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and man-
slaughter under Nebraska felony murder law. Indeed, as noted injustice Thomas'
opinion, the state's high court "has held for over 100 years, in both capital and
noncapital cases, that second-degree murder and manslaughter are not lesser
included offenses of felony murder."25 "Thus, as a matteroflaw, Nebraska prosecu-
tors cannot obtain convictions for second-degree murder or manslaughter in a
felony murder trial."26  Absent state law identifying the inclusion of lesser in-
cluded offenses under the definition of a crime, the Court reasoned that the due
process clause does not require instruction as to these offenses. 27 Specifically, the
Court found no prejudice directed toward the capital defendant as compared with
the non-capital defendant charged with felony murder since, in Nebraska law and
practice, when lesser included offenses are identified for a crime, both capital and non-
capital defendants receive the lesser included offense instruction.8
The differences between the sentencing procedures of the two schemes also
played a significant role in the Court's decision. Under Alabama law at the time
Beck was decided, the jury imposed the defendant's sentence. 29 As a result of
instructions excluding the lesser included offenses defined by state law, the jury
would be left with the unappealing choice between taking the defendant's life or
22. Hopkins v. Reeves, 118 S. Ct. 1895, 1903 (1998).
23. Id at 1900-03.
24. Id at 1900.
25. Id
26. Reeves, 118 S. Ct. at 1900 (emphasis in original).
27. Id The Court noted that, were due process to require that the jury be instructed as to
lesser included offenses notidentified by state law, "[that] would be to allow [the defendant's] jury
to find beyond a reasonable doubt elements that the State had not attempted to prove, and indeed
that it had ignored during the course of trial." Id at 1902.
28. Id Under the Beck scenario, capital defendants did not receive lesser included offense
instructions that were offered to noneampitaldefendants under the Alabama death penalty statute. See
Beck, 447 U.S. at 628.
29. Reeves, 118 S. Ct. at 1900. Today, the jury gives an advisory sentence which the trial court
considers but is not bound to follow. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1998).
1998]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
granting him his complete freedom if they found him guilty of some crime other
than the capital crime.3" By contrast, in Nebraska, the jury determines the guilt or
innocence of the defendant, but the sentencing is left to the consideration of a
three-judge sentencing panel.31 This panel is not faced with a "freedom or death"
choice, but, rather, a literal "life or death" choice.32
B. Enmund v. Florida33 Prerequisite of Intent Finding
Under Nebraska law, felony murder requires only a killing, not a murder, in
the commission of an enumerated felony.' Accordingly, there is no requirement
of a culpable mental state with respect to the homicide; the killing could, in fact,
be accidental. The United States Supreme Court has held that felony murder can
be used to establish guilt of the most serious form of murder but a death sen-
tence may not be imposed absent a finding that the defendant actually intended
to kill or knew deadly force would be used in the commission of the crime.
35
The Court later modified this rule to provide that death was not a disproportion-
ate sentence if the defendant was a major participant in a felony and acted with
reckless disregard for human life.36 The Court has also said that the jury need not
make the culpability finding required by Enmund v. Florida and Tison v. Arizona; it
is permissible for an appellate court to do so." The Reeves majority relied on the
assumption that this finding of culpability had previously been made. However,
the Court failed to identify a point in the record where the Cabana v. Bullock
finding had been made.
Significantly for Virginia practitioners, the exact issue raised in Reeveswill not
arise in Virginia practice because capital murder cannot be established under
Virginia law through the felony murder rule. Every section of the Virginia capital
murder statute requires that the homicide be "willful, deliberate and premedi-
tated."38 That very fact, however, is a reminder that second degree murder and
involuntary manslaughter are lesser included offenses of capital murder in
Virginia. Indeed, a homicide that would otherwise be murder may be reduced to
voluntary manslaughter in some instances.
39
30. Riees, 118 S. Ct. at 1900.
31. Id at 1901.
32. Id at 1901-02.
33. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
34. See infra note 9 for specific language of the Nebraska capital murder statute.
35. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
36. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (holding that "major participation in the
felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the
Enmund culpability requirement").
37. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376,392 (1986) (stating that "the Eighth Amendment does
not require that a jury make the findings required by Enmund').
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Michie 1998).
39. See Barrett v. Commonwealth, 341 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1986) (sustaining conviction for
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Thus, it is important not to overlook evidence that fairly raises the issue of
lesser included offenses. Virginia law requires that in those instances juries be
instructed on the lesser offenses. The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that,
when supported by the evidence, a second degree murder instruction is appropri-
ate.4o
Alix Marie Karl
unlawful wounding despite homicide); Moxley v. Commonwealth, 77 S.E.2d 389 (Va. 1953)
(showing that although the defendant did not specifically argue that he shot the victim in the heat
of passion, jury finding that circumstances justified self-defense claim sustained).
40. Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 757,769 (Va. 1989). The only limitation on this
rule is that "the evidence asserted in support of such an instruction 'must amount to more than a
scintilla."' Id (citations omitted).
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